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UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT
CHARLES HOROWITZ*
In August 1964 the Uniform Law Commnission adopted the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act in response to a long felt need for legislative re-
form in the area of trustees' powers. The new act applies the "prudent
ian" concept to the entire field of trustees' powers, an approach proposed
by Professor William F. Fratcher in an article published in 1962 en-
titled Trustees' Powers Legislation.** Charles Horowitz, Esq., Chair-
man of the Uniform Law Commission's Special Committee which was
responsible for drafting the new act, discusses the basic approach of the
act and the changes the act will effect in the traditional law of trusts.
The trust as a method by which one may use an asset for the benefit
of another' is a widely used and socially valuable device in the United
States today. However, the traditional law of trusts, based on rules of
interpretation crystallized two centuries ago,2 has not proved adequate
to the needs of those who presently seek to make maximum beneficial
use of the device.
Since, in the absence of legislation, the powers of a trustee are
derived exclusively from the instrument creating the trust,' the law of
trusts has developed primarily as a set of rules for determining the
trustor's intention. However, the courts have not kept pace with chang-
ing social and economic conditions and consequent changes in trust
usages and trustors' intentions in the development of rules of inter-
pretation. Trusts in the 18th century were most commonly used to
maintain family lands intact through the family settlement. The role
* fember, Seattle and Washington State Bar Associations. A.B., University of
Washington, 1925; LL.B., University of Washington, 1927. The writer, while taking
full responsibility for the views expressed in this article, wishes to acknowledge the
valued assistance rendered to him by Forrest W. Walls, Esq. of the Seattle, Washington,
Bar. B.A., Seattle Pacific College, 1960; LL.B., University of Washington, 1962.
** 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627 (1962).
1 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §2 (1959). See 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 8-
21 (1955). This act deals with a type of fiduciary relationship created by a voluntary
act (RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 17 (1959)) whether with or without consid-
eration and whether the purpose is private or public as in the case of a spendthrift or
charitable trust. 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 19 (Public and Private Trusts), 21 (1955). Not
all fiduciary relationships are covered. Fiduciary relations existing between guardian
and ward, principal and agent, attorney and client and other relationships voluntarily
assumed but not in the forms of express trusts are excluded. Excluded are confidential
relations such as those existing between members of a family, physician and patient, or
priest and penitent. Such relationships do not contemplate general trust administration
in the sense covered by this act. RESTATEIMNT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 7-16, 16A, 16B,
16C (1959). For a discussion distinguishing "trustee" from other relationships, see
89 C.J.S. Trusts § 3 (1955).
2 See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 627, 658 (1962).
The trust concept as known in the United States today is derived from English Law.
See MAITnAND, EQUITy 23 passim (2d ed. 1936); JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 95-101, 221-25 (3d ed. 1924).
3 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 186 (1959).
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of the trustee in such a trust was essentially passive; his function was
to preserve contingent remainders, to protect the eldest son during
minority, and to raise portions for daughters and younger sons. Rights
of management and possession of the property ordinarily belonged
to the life tenant, not to the trustee. In view of the restricted nature
of the trustee's functions, the courts' narrow interpretation of express
powers and reluctance to find implied powers usually accorded with
the trustor's actual intention."
In the 20th century trusts have a more diversified use and trustees
are called on to play a far more active role than in the 18th century.
The modern trust is often created for investment and management of
funds or property; the trustee has the right to possession of the corpus
and active duties in its management. The trustee today is often ham-
pered in effective and efficient administration of the trust by applica-
tion of the old rules of strict construction of powers.
Although the nature of the trustee's role has drastically changed
since the 18th century, his powers, read against this background of long
established precedent, have on the whole been narrowly construed;'
this, notwithstanding the general rule that a trustee has all powers
expressly conferred and necessarily implied, but not prohibited, to
accomplish trust purposes.' Thus, in the absence of express provisions
a power of sale, whether express or implied, does not ordinarily include
the power to sell on credit;' the trustee cannot make permanent im-
provements even if the trust contains a power to repair;8 he has no
power to exchange trust property without express authorization;' the
power to partition is rarely implied;"0 there is no implied power to
change the character or form of the trust estate except under unusual
circumstances;" the power to encumber, mortgage or pledge a trust
4 Fratcher, supra note 2, at 658.
5 See, e.g., 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 246 n.33 (1955) ; Stengel v. Royal Realty Corp., 179
Md. 204, 17 A.2d 127 (1941) ; Prysi v. Prysi, 3 Ohio Supp. 40 (1936) ; Fratcher, supra
note 2, at 629, n.11.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 186 (1959).
7 See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632. But cf., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
190(j) (1959) with reference to express power of sale. Nor is the power to sell
implied. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 287 (1955).
8 At common law, a trustee generally had the power to make repairs reasonably
necessary to preserve the property, but could not make permanent improvements. See
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 601 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; 2
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 188.2 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as 2 ScoT]; 54 Am. JUR.
Trusts § 359 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 282 (1955).
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 190(m) (1959) ; 2 SCOTT §§ 190.9, 190.
9A; 54 Am. JUR. Trusts § 342 (1945) ; Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632-33.
10 See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632.
11 Generally, a trustee has, at common law, no implied power to change the char-
[VoL. 41: 1
UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT
asset is ordinarily withheld, 2 especially for a term extending beyond
the term of the trust;' 3 the trustee cannot make a lease extending
beyond the period of the trust;"4 he cannot grant an option involving
the disposition of a trust asset;" he cannot hold a security in the name
of a nominee;'" he cannot borrow money;' in some cases the trustee
has no power to employ investment advisors;"8 he cannot act on the
recommendation of an agent without independent investigation; 9 nor
can the trustee delegate discretion.2"
Although in theory these protective rules have been predicated on
the intent of the trustor, the trustor has been presumed to have the
intent of an 18th century trustor. In practice today these rules are
based on a distrust of the trustee-even express powers are limited
by the rules of strict interpretation. 2' If the trustor wishes to avoid these
restrictions on the powers of the trustee, he is required to anticipate
and expressly provide against them. Unless the draftsman is thor-
oughly familiar with the technical rules of law applicable, the trustor,
acter or form of the trust estate except where the welfare of the trust demands such a
change. See 54 AM. Jura. Trusts §342 (1945).
2° The common law generally withheld these powers, absent express or clearly im-
plied authorization. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 191 (1959) ; BOGERT §§
751-55; 2 SCOTT § 191.1-4; 54 Am. JuR. Trusts §§ 476-80 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts §
311 (Mortgage or Pledge) (1955) ; Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 181 (1959). Cf. Fratcher, supra note Z
at 631.
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 189(C) (1959) ; 54 Am. JuR. Trusts §§
472-75 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 319(b) (5) (b) (1955) ; cf. 2 SCOTT § 190.8.
IS The common law generally prohibits such a grant, even when the trustee has a
power of sale. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 190(k) (1959). See generally
2 SCOTT § 190.8; Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632; UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION
ACT § 2(b). Citations herein make no distinction between the first and second tenta-
tive drafts of the now defunct Uniform Trust Administration Act. These drafts vary
substantively only in the introductory paragraph of § 2 and in § 2(o) and § 2(i). The
first tentative draft may be found in National Conference of Conmissioners on Unli-form State Laws, 1932 Handbook 242-48 and the second in 1933 Handbook 310-36.
10 Generally, express authorization for the exercise of this power is required at
common law. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 325(e) (1959). See also UNI-
FORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 2(m); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-403;
UNIFORM TRUSTS AcT § 9; Fratcher, supra note 2, at 663.
17 The decisional law (in the absence of express power) generally so holds. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 191 (2) (1959). Compare 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 279
(1955).
1s Decisional law is divided as to the power of a trustee to employ investment ad-
visors. See 2 SCOTT § 188.3. Fratcher, supra note 2, at 63941, concerning the rule
against delegation of functions by the trustee. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 225 (1959).
'9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 171(h) (1959); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 257
(1955).
20 The common law limits rather strictly the power of a trustee to delegate the per-
formance of a discretionary act. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 171 (d), (j),
188(c); BOGERT §§ 555, 557; 54 Am. JuR. Trusts §§ 309, 310, 329 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S.
Trusts § 256 (1959). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 225 (1959). See Fratcher,
supra note 2, at 640-41.
21 See note 5 su pra.
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trustee or third persons often find that the trustee does not possess
adequate powers to fulfill trust purposes.
The restrictive rules as to the scope of the trustee's powers are
buttressed by rules of strict accountability to the beneficiary" and of
third person responsibility. Under well established law a third person
dealing with a trustee is put on notice as to the extent of the trustee's
powers in the transaction involved. If the third person has actual or
constructive notice that the trustee is violating his duties 2 or exceeding
his powers,"' the transaction may be void 5 or voidable 6 and the third
person may be liable to the trustor for any damage caused. As a
result, third persons may justifiably be reluctant to deal with a trustee.
Restrictions on trustees' powers combined with the fear of third per-
sons may prevent effective trust administration. Although the trustee
may seek judicial relief by way of instructions, augmentation of trust
powers or removal of restrictions on their exercise," these remedies
often prove unavailing, costly, or impractical because of the delay
involved.
Accordingly, much of traditional trust law needs to be reformed to
meet the needs of those who seek to make maximum beneficial use
of the trust device. That there is no necessity for maintaining the
status quo in the field of trust powers may be seen in the many
statutory revisions of trust powers that have been made in the past.
In England a comprehensive statutory revision of trust powers, which
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 174, 176-84, 186, 206, 223, 232 (1959);
see generally 54 Am. JUR. Trusts § 338 (1945).
23 See note 24 infra.
24 At common law, third persons knowingly dealing with trustees are generally held
to a duty of inquiry and are chargeable with constructive knowledge of a trustee's
breach of duty which they might reasonably have discovered in the exercise of due care.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 283-320 (1959) ; BOGET, § 565; 54 Am. JuR.
Trusts § 305 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 246 n.56 (1955) ; Fratcher, supra note 2, at
644, 646, 662, 663; UNIFORM COMiMERcIAL CODE § 8-403 (3).
25 If trustee exceeds his powers, his acts may be a nullity. See 90 CJ.S. Trusts §
246 nn.53-54 (1955). As to such acts being merely voidable, see note 26 infra. Sec-
tion 7 (see text accompanying notes 152-59 infra) changes the rule as to third persons
acting in ignorance of trustee's lack of power. Powers would be limited on winding
up of the trust because it would not be prudent to exercise powers to unnecessarily
prolong the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 344-47 (1959).2 6 Il re Chambers Estate, 136 Ohio St. 202, 24 N.E.2d 601 (1939) ; Wichita Royalty
Co. v. City Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 109 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
644 (1940).
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 326 (1959) ; Fratcher, supra note 2, at
646 n.117.
28 Want of power would either prevent action by the trustee or require recourse to
the courts for judicial augmentation of power. See UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS AcT
§ 5, and text at note 142 infra. The decisional law allows such relief when, because of
circumstances not known to the trustor when the trust was created and not anticipated
by him, failure to do so would substantially defeat or impair the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trusts. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 167 (1959), Fratcher,
supra note 2, at 654-56.
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has been influential in the Dominions,"' was enacted in 1925.30 In the
United States all fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes
which in one way or another affect the powers of a trustee."
The Uniform Law Commission considered a proposed Uni-
form Trust Administration Act in 1932 and 1933,11 but could not agree
upon either the First or Second Tentative Draft and abandoned the
project until 1961.1' The 1932 First Tentative Draft, which was mainly
a list of powers, was adopted by Florida, 4 Oklahoma," and Texas. 6
29Fratcher, supra note 2, at 627, n.4 cites: E.g., ALTA. REV. STAT. c. 346 (1955);
B.C. REV. STAT. c. 390 (1960); MAN. REV. STAT. c. 273 (1954) ; N.B. REv. STAT. c.
239 (1952); Trustee Act, 1925, 10 N.S.W. Stat. 1824-1937, p. 556 N.S. REv. STAT.
c. 301 (1954); ONT. REv. STAT. c. 408 (1960) ; PR ED. I. REV. STAT. c. 167 (1951) ;
SASE. REV. STAT. c. 123 (1953). Cf. Trustees & Executors Acts, 1897 to 1924, 9Queensland Pub. Acts 582 (1828-1936).
302 Trustee Act, 15 and 16 Geo. 5, c. 19 (1925) ; Settled Land Act, 15 and 16 Geo.
5, c. 18 (1925) ; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 and 16 Geo. 5, c. 20; and the Trustee
Investments Act, 1961, 9 and 10 Eliz. 2, c. 62. See generally Fratcher, Fiduciary
Administration in England, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 12-99 (1965).
31 Fratcher, supra note 2, at 628, n.137 cites: AL.A. CODE, tit. 47, §§ 154(1)-(10)
(Supp. 1959); ALASKA CouP. LAWS ANN. §§ 22-8-1 to -12 (Supp. 1958) ; AiRz. REV.
STAT. ANN. 8§ 44-2071 to -2080 (Supp. 1961) ; ARx. STAT. 8§ 50-901 to -910 (Supp.
1961) ; CAL. Crw. CODE §§ 1154-65; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8§ 45-101 to -109 (1960) ;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4501-10 (Supp. 1960) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-214 to -224(Supp, 1960) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 710. 01- .10 (Supp 1961) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-
301 to -313 (Supp. 1961) ; HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 338A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1960) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 68-801 to -810 (Supp. 1961) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 531-41 (Smith-
Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-801 to -810 (Supp. 1961); IowA CODE ANN. §§
565A.1- .11 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-901 to -911 (Supp. 1959);
KY. RXV. STAT. §§ 385.010-.100 (1960); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:735:742 (Supp.
1961) ; ME. Rmv. STAT. ANN. C. 158-A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1961) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,§§ 213-22 (1957) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201(A), §§ 1-11 (1958) ; MicH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27.3178 (241. 21)-(241. 31) (Supp. 1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.01-.11(Supp. 1960); ISS. CODE ANN. §§ 672-101 to-113 (Supp. 1960); Mo. REv. STAT. §§
404.010-.100 (1959); M1ONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1801 to -1811 (Supp. 1961);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 38-1001 to -1010, -1101 to -1105 (1960), NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 167.
010-100 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 463-A:1 to -A:10 (Supp. 1961); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:38-1 to -12 (Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-20-1 to -10
(Supp. 1961); N.Y. PRS. PROP. LAW §§ 265-71; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-68 to -77(Supp. 1961); N.C. CENT. CODE §§ 47-24-01 to -10 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
8§ 1339.31-.39 (Page 1962); OKr.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 401-10 (Supp. 1961); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 126.805-.880 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 3601-11 (Supp. 1960);
RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 18-7-1 to -11 (Supp. 1961); S.D. CODE §§ 43.0701 (Supp.
1960) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-801 to -810 (Supp. 1961) ; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5923-101, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3201-09 (1959); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-26 to -36 (Supp. 1960) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 21.24.010-.900 (1961) ;
W. V.4- CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-1 to -11 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.61-.71(1958) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-127 to -136 (1957) ; COLO. SESs. LAWS 1961, ch. 231;
S.C. Acrs & RESOLUTIONS 1961, No. 330.32 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1932 Handbook
242-48; 1933 Handbook 80-82, 310-36. The Second Tentative Draft was annotated
with citations to the decisions of many jurisdictions.
33 The committee appointed consisted of: Commissioners Howard Dresbach, Robert
B. Harwood, Coleman Karesh (replacing R. Jasper Smith, deceased), A. Pratt Kess-
ler, George H. Bowen, and the writer, as Chairman.34 FLA. STAT. ANN. cl. 691 (1944).
3' OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, 175.1-.53 (1944).30 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 742b (1960); Boyles, Texas Trust Act, 6 TEXAS
BAn. J. 149 (1943) ; Moorhead, The Texas Trust Act, 22 TEXAs L. REV. 123 (1944).
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The Second Tentative Draft differed from the First in that the powers
were to be given to the trustee only if the trust expressly granted
"full statutory powers." Arkansas has a comprehensive trustees' pow-
ers statute, effective when incorporated by reference into the trust
instrument;17 Illinois," Louisiana," Pennsylvania, ° Rhode Island, '
and Washington42 also have fairly comprehensive trustees' powers acts.
On the whole, however, most states have only piecemeal legislation,
directed at particular problems."
The most successful statutory revisions to date have been those
dealing with investment powers of the trustee. Initially the courts
adopted a conservative attitude in making rules as to proper invest-
ments. They drew somewhat mechanical distinctions among permis-
sible investments in bonds, common and preferred stocks, real estate
and personal property, mortgages and the like.4 Gradually the deci-
sional rules were subjected to statutory modifications," many of which
set out eligible trust investment lists.4" These modifications, however,
failed to take into account that times and economic conditions change,
and that investments which seem proper at one time may prove unwise
at a later date. It became apparent that investment powers must be
made more flexible in order to respond to prevailing economic condi-
tions. To meet this problem, the legislatures of many states enacted
the so-called "prudent man" rule,4" which gives the trustee power to
act where, in the exercise of prudence, he deems action necessary.
37 ARK. AcTs 1961, No. 153; Bowen, Powers of the Trustee of an Express Trust in
Arkansas, 2 Ax. L. REy. 153 (1948).38 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, § 35 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
39 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2111-:2128 (1951).
40 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.93-.969 (1950).
41 R. I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 18-4-2 (Supp. 1961).
4 2 WASH. Ray. CODE §§ 30.99.010-.910 (1961).
43 Fratcher, supra note 2, at 629.
44 Id. at 634.
45 Id. at 635.
46 Fratcher sets out four categories of legislation as to types of investments: "(1)
mandatory legal lists restricting trust investments to listed types of securities; (2)
mandatory legal lists requiring a stipulated proportion of the trust property to be
invested in listed types of securities but permitting the rest to be invested under the
'prudent man' rule; (3) permissive legal lists authorizing investment in listed types of
securities and also expressly authorizing investment of all or any part of the trust
property under the 'prudent man' rule, and (4) permissive legal lists authorizing
investment in listed types of securities and, by implication, permitting investment of all
or any part of the trust property under the 'prudent man' rule." Fratcher supra note 2,
at 635 & nn.59-62.4 7 In re Trusteeship Under Agreement with Charles H. Mayo, 251 Minn. 91, 105
N.W.2d 900 (1960).
48 The prudent man standard is based on the well known case of Harvard College v.
Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830). Since then, prudent man investment statutes have
been widely adopted. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 3024.010-.110 (1955). See 23
WAs H. L. REv. 78 (1948).
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Used alone4" and in conjunction with eligible investment lists,5" the
prudent man rule adds resiliency and adaptability in trust administra-
tion and discourages reliance on mechanical guidelines. It permits a
constant adjustment in investment powers to the needs of the trust
over the years, avoiding both the problem of current power deficiencies
and the problem that trust powers, adequate when granted, may later
prove inadequate.
The success of the prudent man rule in the field of investment pow-
ers"I suggested the remedy for the problem of trustee powers in general.
In Trustees' Powers Legislation, an article published in 1962,52 Profes-
sor William F. Fratcher proposed that trust powers be defined as those
powers needed by the prudent man to perform trust purposes, rather
than merely in terms of specifically described powers." The Uniform
Law Commission's Special Committee charged with drafting a uniform
act dealing with trustees' powers adopted Professor Fratcher's theory.
The adoption of the prudent man concept in defining trustees'
powers necessarily changes and liberalizes the doctrine of implied
powers. Under existing law, powers may be implied if deemed by the
court to be necessary to accomplish trust purposes; 54 under the prudent
man rule, implied powers are those which the trustee in the exercise
of prudence believes necessary. The trustee must determine whether
he has the necessary power to act; if he makes such a determination
in good faith and within the bounds of reasonable judgment, the courts
should be precluded from substituting their judgment for that of the
trustee.5
As pointed out by Professor Fratcher,0 applying the prudent man
concept to the entire field of trustees' powers necessitates a re-
examination of the traditional law of third person responsibility in
dealing with trustees. Under the prudent man rule it would be neces-
sary for third persons constantly to determine whether the trustee has
or is exercising the powers which as a prudent trustee he should have
or exercise. Obviously, the difficulty involved in making such a deter-
-1 See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 635.5 Ibid.51 This success is evidenced by the wide adoption of the prudent man rule. The dis-
advantages of investment restrictions become apparent as times change. See, e.g., In re
Trusteeship Under Agreement with Charles H. Mayo, 251 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900(1960).
237 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 627 (1962).
53 Id. at 660.
G See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 186 (1959).55 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 187 (1959) ; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
Blume, 65 Wash. Dec. 2d 622, 630, 399 P.2d 76 (1965).50 Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627, 644 (1962).
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mination would stultify the effective exercise of trustees' powers. The
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act therefore takes into account the neces-
sity for protecting third parties.5"
Another problem dealt with by the new act concerns the tax con-
sequences involved in the existence and exercise of trust powers."
Both federal and state laws have taxed or withheld tax exemptions,
deductions or credits on the basis of the presence or absence of cer-
tain kinds of trust powers or their exercise." The Special Committee
in drafting the new act adopted the view that the trustor presumably
intended to avoid adverse tax consequences in the exercise of trust
powers, and that both he and the trust should be protected against
such consequences. Thus, the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act adopted
by the Uniform Law Commission in 1964 embodies the prudent man
concept of trust powers, subject to fiduciary accountability," takes
into account the necessity for protecting third parties, and provides for
protection of the trustor and the trustee against adverse tax conse-
quences.
II.
Let us now turn to a consideration of the provisions of that act.
Changes from traditional law will be briefly noted (but in light of the
new basic approach of the act). The words "no change" indicate that
apart from the new basic approach, no change in the traditional rule
has been attempted.
Section 1. [Definitions] As used in this Act:
(1) "trust" means an express trust created by a trust instrument,
including a will, whereby a trustee has the duty to administer a trust
asset for the benefit of a named or otherwise described income or princi-
pal beneficiary, or both; "trust" does not include a resulting or con-
structive trust, a business trust which provides for certificates to be
issued to the beneficiary, an investment trust, a voting trust, a security
instrument, a trust created by the judgment or decree of a court, a
liquidation trust, or a trust for the primary purpose of paying dividends,
interests, interest coupons, salaries, wages, pensions or profits, or em-
ployee benefits of any kind, an instrument wherein a person is nominee
or escrowee for another, a trust created in deposits in any financial
institution, or other trust the nature of wbich does not admit of general
trust administration;
5 7 UN Fom TausTEEs' PowFas AcT § 7.58 Id. at § 3 (b).
59 See UNIFOP-mi TRusTEEs" POWERS ACT § 3(b).60 Rules of fiduciary accountability are retained by the Uo~m TRusmTs' POWERS
AcT § 3 (b).
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(2) "trustee" means an original, added, or successor trustee;
(3) "prudent man" means a trustee whose exercise of trust powers is
reasonable and equitable in view of the interests of income or principal
beneficiaries, or both, and in view of the manner in which men of ordi-
nary prudence, diligence, discretion, and judgment would act in the
management of their own affairs.
The kinds of "trusts" to which the act does not apply are illustrated
in considerable detail. Thus, the act does not apply to resulting or
constructive trusts;"' to business trusts which provide for certificates
to be issued to the beneficiary; 2 to investment trusts, 3 voting trusts, 4
security instruments,"3 trusts created by judgment or decree of a
court," liquidation trusts,"7 trust for the primary purpose of paying
dividends, interest or interest coupons;" to salaries, wages, pensions or
profits or employee benefits of any kind; 9 to nominees and escrows; 70
to bank deposit or savings and loan association deposit trusts;"' or
generally to any other trust, the nature of which does not contemplate
general trust administration."' However, an instrument which is not a
trust as defined in the act may incorporate by reference any part of the
act by virtue of section 2 (b).
0 1 These are not necessarily voluntary manifestations of intent but remedies con-
ferred by law to protect against wrongdoing. For a discussion, see RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION § 160 (1937); 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 14 (Resulting Trusts), 15 (Con-
structive Trusts) (1955).
02 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), which contrasts ordinary
trusts with business trusts. See generally, 12 C.J.S. Business Trusts § 1 (1938).
"3,or a discussion of investment trusts see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS 8
227(n) (1959) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 329 (1955) ; 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 1061
(1938).
04 See generally 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 552 (Voting Trusts) (1939).
65 E.g., deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage. See generally 59 CJ.S. Mortgages
§5 (1949).60 See generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 217(d) at 157 (1955).
07 E.g., assignment for benefit of creditors, see 6 C.J.S. Assignment for Benefit of
Creditors, §11 (Creation of Trust) (1937), or liquidation trusts in corporate voluntary
dissolution proceedings. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.530 (1958).63 Accord, WASH. REv. CODE § 30.99.010 (1959).
r9 Fringe benefit trusts, including retirement trusts for self-employed individuals,
are often created or conformed to obtain income tax benefits provided by INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 401, 501. It is thought best to avoid possible disqualifying implied
powers for income tax purposes.
70 See generally 30 CJ.S. Escrows §§ 1-2 (1942) ; 66 CJ.S. Nominee (1950). Most
states have statutory provisions covering trusts of this nature.
7. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 3020.035 (1950) (Commercial Banks); WASH.
REv. CODE § 32.12.030 (1963) (Mutual Savings Banks) ; WASH. RFv. CODE § 33.20.070
(1958) (Savings and Loan Associations).
72A similar, although not identical, set of exceptions is set forth in WASH. Rv.
CODE § 30.99.010 (1959) and in WASH. REv. CODE § 30.30.010 (1955). The act does not
apply to an executor or administrator (see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 6
(1959), not to passive trusts. See generally 89 CJ.S. Trusts § 17 (Passive and Active
Trusts) (1955). Cf. definition in UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION AcT § 1; Fratcher,
supra note 56, at 627-29.
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The trusts to which the act does apply contemplate general trust
administration. These are inter vivos and testamentary trusts, public
and charitable trusts, and private trusts. The act treats trust powers
as attached to the office rather than the person of the trustee."3 Thus
the powers will attach to the original, added or successor trustee.74
However, the trustor may provide otherwise in the trust instrument
pursuant to section 2 (a).
A "prudent man" is defined in section 1(3) as "a trustee whose
exercise of trust powers is reasonable and equitable in view of the
interests of income or principal beneficiaries, or both, and in view
of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, discretion and
judgment would act in the management of their own affairs.""t This
definition is in substance taken from the prudent man rule in the field
of investment powers." The act does not abridge the fiduciary duties
imposed upon a prudent man in the exercise of conferred powers, for
it imposes upon him the duty to exercise only those powers which he
ought to exercise, considering what is reasonable and equitable in view
of the interests of the beneficiary and in view of his position as a
fiduciary. His duties as a fiduciary include the duty to administer the
trust, to keep and render accounts, to furnish information to the bene-
ficiary, to exercise reasonable care and skill, to take and keep control
of the trust property, to preserve the trust property, to enforce claims
held in trust, to defend actions involving the trust, to keep trust prop-
erty separate, to exercise reasonable care in the making of bank
deposits, to make trust property productive, to pay income to the
beneficiary, to deal impartially with beneficiaries, to cooperate with
co-trustees, to cooperate with a person holding power of control, and
to be loyal to the interests of the beneficiaries by not profiting from
his position as trustee except by way of reasonable compensation.77
73 Section 1 (2) of the act reads:
"(2) 'Trustee' means an original, added or successor trustee ;"
The court has power to appoint a successor trustee, or to increase or diminish the
number of trustees. The trust may itself authorize the addition or diminution of
trustees. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 221 n.55 (1955). The older common law rule, and more
modern variations, that discretionary authority cannot be exercised by court-appointed
successors is superseded. Cf. Fratcher, supra note 56, at 627. The powers of the trustee,
as described in the act, attach to the office of the trustee and are not personal. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 196 (1959) ; BOGERT § 553; 54 Am. JUR. Trusts §§
298, 303 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 259 (1955) ; UNioams TRUSTS ACT § 10.
74 UNiFORm TRUSTEES' Powras AT § 1 (2).
75 See note 48 supra.
76 See Fratcher, supra note 56, at 634, 636.77For a discussion of the duties of a trustee, see generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TRUSTS §§ 174, 176-84, 186, 206, 223, 232 (1959) ; BOGERT §§ 584-91, 595-98; 54 Al.
JurL Trusts §§ 311, passim, 396-408, 453, 468, 469, 497-513 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§
247, 248, 250, 251, 270, 377 (1955).
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The prudent man concept correlates the fiduciary duties of a trustee
and the powers of a trustee utilized in the performance of those duties.
The trustee has only those powers which he ought to have to perform
fiduciary duties. He can exercise only those powers conferred which
he ought to exercise in the performance of those duties. The mere
existence of power is not enough to justify its exercise. It is only if
power conferred ought to be exercised that a trustee is permitted to
exercise power. This concept may not be too different from the
traditional concept in which power is conferred but its exercise is
restricted by the requirements of duty. Thus, a trustee given the power
to sell under existing law is not necessarily excused for a violation of
a trust duty simply because exercise of the power was authorized."
The prudent man concept therefore does not change the law in this
respect. Suppose, however, that express powers conferred are inade-
quate and must be augmented to permit the trustee to perform an act
which in his judgment should be performed to accomplish a trust
purpose-for example, the lease of property for a period beyond the
trust term.' Under the prudent man concept the trustee would have
that power even though it was not expressly conferred. Under the
present law," however, it would be necessary to obtain judicial augmen-
tation or permission in order to exercise this power.8"
The powers described are ipso facto conferred on all trusts to which
the act applies. This approach had been adopted by the First Draft
of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act of 1932. The Second Draft
conferred power only where there was express incorporation by refer-
ence. 12 The present act expressly provides, however, that the ipso facto
rule applies in the absence of limitations in the trust instrument or
under the act or except as is otherwise provided in a specifically de-
scribed statute. 83
78 li re Durstan's Will, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947).
70 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 189 (1959) ; 2 SCOTT § 189.1-7;
54 Amx. JuR. Trusts § 471 (1945); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 319 (1955); UxNFo~m TRUST
ADmINISTRAT oN ACT § 2(c) ; Fratcher, supra note 56, at 631.
80 At common law, a trustee may not ordinarily make a lease extending beyond the
period of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 189(c) (1959) ; See generally
4 Am. Jun. Trusts §§ 472-75 (1945) ; 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 319(b) (5) (b) (1955) ; 2
SCOTT § 190.8.
81 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
82 See note 32 supra.
83 Section 2(a) makes provision for possible statutory modification of the act. Thus
a power conferred by the UNrFOR TRUSTEES' PoWNERs ACT may be excepted, limited or
prohibited, or procedure for its exercise regulated by statute. Furthermore, there may
be statutes that are not intended to be superseded. Obviously, as between the trustee and
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Section 2. [Powers of Trustee Conferred by Trust or by Law.]
(a) The trustee has all powers conferred upon him by the provisions
of this Act unless limited in the trust instrument [and except as is other-
wise provided in .... ].
(b) An instrument which is not a trust under section 1(1) may
incorporate any part of this Act by reference.
Section 2 of the act makes it quite clear that the trustor can still
control the powers that he confers by express limitation in the trust
instrument. He can, if he desires, provide that none of the powers in
the act should be applicable to the trust or that the only powers applica-
ble to the trust should be those which he expressly sets forth therein;
or he can, if he wishes, adopt only certain powers in the act by refer-
ence or by express description. However, for the reasons hereinafter
stated in the discussion of section 7 of the act (providing protection
for third persons dealing with the trustee) it is believed that a pro-
vision excluding the operation of section 7 would be inoperative as
violative of the basic purposes of the act. The remedy for breach of
limitations or prohibitions on the exercise of power is against the
trustee or third person with actual knowledge of such limitations or
prohibitions. Accordingly, as between trustor and trustee, the act by
its terms becomes a means by which a trustor can either accept the
prudent man concept by saying nothing about it or he can adopt so
much of the act as he believes would apply to his needs. Furthermore,
as to trusts which are excluded from the operation of the statute,8
the trustor may incorporate by reference any part of the act which fits
his purpose. This practice might be especially desirable in the case
of retirement or employee benefit trusts which are special continuing
trusts and may need broad powers but, because of their peculiar nature
and tax aspects, should be drafted with specific reference to specified
powers.
Provision is made in the act for retention of existing statutes deal-
ing with trust powers. An example would be if the legislature wished
to retain specific controls over the exercise of a trust power requiring
court order.
the beneficiary such statutory provisions are binding upon the trustee. They are like-
wise binding upon third persons dealing with the trustee notwithstanding the provisions
of § 7 of the act, either because § 7 of the act does not apply to powers excepted from
the operation of the act under § 2(a) or because third persons are conclusively charged
with knowledge of the existence of such statutory provisions and, therefore, by the
language of § 7, bound by such statutory provisions.
84 See UNrFOm? TRusTms' PowEas AcT § 1(1).
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Section 3. [Powers of Trustees Conferred by this Act]
(a) From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of the
assets of the trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without court
authorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for the
purpose of the trust including but not limited to the powers specified in
subsection (c).
This is an introductory broad grant of power to perform every act
which a prudent man would perform for purposes of the trust until
final distribution. This broad grant of power means exactly what it
says. It is to be applied even if the needed powers go beyond the
present law as to the scope of trustees' powers where they are listed
as express powers. To make certain that this is clearly understood,
section 3(c) of the act describes twenty-six express powers, some of
which, as will be seen in a later discussion, go beyond existing law in
very important respects.
Section 3(b) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers
granted by this Act, a trustee has a duty to act with due regard to his
obligation as a fiduciary, including a duty not to exercise any power under
this Act in such a way as to deprive the trust of an otherwise available
tax exemption, deduction, or credit for tax purposes or deprive a donor of
a trust asset of a tax exemption, deduction, or credit or operate to impose
a tax upon a donor or other person as owner of any portion of the trust.
"Tax" includes, but is not limited to, any federal, state or local income,
gift, estate, or inheritance tax.
This section changes existing law. The relationship of section 3 (b)
to sections 3(a) and 3(c) should be understood. Section 3(b) pro-
ceeds upon the assumption that generally a trustor prefers to preserve
all tax benefits, exemptions, deductions and credits possible in con-
nection with the trust. The advantages of tax exempt status under
the federal law are substantial. For example, there is no federal income
tax liability except on "unrelated business taxable income" as con-
templated by I.R.C. Section 511, et seq. Contributions to the trust
are deductible by donors under I.R.C. Section 170. Bequests, legacies,
devices, transfers or gifts to or for the use of the trust are deductible
for federal estate and gift tax purposes under I.R.C. Sections 2055,
2106 and 2522. Exemption from tax also exists under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (social security taxes) and under the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. I.R.C. Sections 3121(b) (8) (B)
and 3306(c) (8). The act, in light of its purposes, does not, however,
prohibit a trustee from exercising trust powers merely because tax
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consequences, unless of a particular type described, will result from
the exercise of power.
First, it is to be remembered that the act does not apply to trusts
for the purpose of paying salaries, wages, pensions, profits or employee
benefits. Accordingly, trusts for pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus
purposes to which I.R.C. Section 401 applies, including self-employed
individual retirement trusts, contributions to which are deductible
under I.R.C. Section 404(a) (10) are not within the act.
A trust to which the act does apply may be, for example, a tax-
exempt charitable trust within the meaning of I.R.C. Section 501(c)
(3), a grantor trust within the meaning of I.R.C. Section 671-8,
inclusive, or a marital deduction trust. 5 Under federal tax law if the
trustee has or exercises statutorily prohibited powers for tax purposes,
the otherwise available tax exemption, deduction or credit may thereby
be lost. It is the purpose, of section 3(b) to restrict the scope of the
exercise of broad powers granted under sections 3(a) and 3(c) so
that otherwise available, i.e. presently enjoyed, independently existing
tax exemptions, deductions or credits available to the trust, will not
be lost. Except to the extent so restrained, the prudent exercise of
trust power is not prevented merely because other tax effects may
follow. Thus, section 3(b) does not prevent the sale or purchase of
a depreciable asset even though income tax liability may follow, nor
does the section prevent the acquisition or disposition of tax exempt
bonds; nor the transfer of funds from a bank, the bank accounts of
which are subject to a state intangible tax, to a savings and loan asso-
ciation, the accounts in which are not so subject; nor the sale of an
under-assessed old house in order to buy one fully assessed. In none
of the examples given, would a trust, as a consequence of the action
taken, lose any independently existing tax exempt status it might
otherwise have (e.g., under I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3)) or lose its
right to take any otherwise independently existing deduction or
credit to which it might be entitled by virtue of its tax exempt status.
However, if the trustee operated an existing tax exempt trust for the
primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business, the trust would
lose its exemption (I.R.C. Section 502) and such an operation would,
therefore, be prohibited. Similarly, a trustee is precluded from engag-
85 See discussion of administrative powers in marital deduction trusts as set forth in
Reg. 202056 (b)-5 as reported 1 CCH FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. para 2091(3)-(4).
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ing in a prohibited transaction as defined in I.R.C. Section 503 or 504
because such transactions would result in the loss of tax exempt
status. On the other hand, if a trustee acquires an asset that imposes
income tax liability upon the trust without destroying the otherwise
existing tax exempt status of the trust (I.R.C. Section 511, et seq.
relating to "unrelated business taxable income"), such an acquisition
is not forbidden if otherwise prudent because it does not fall within
any of the prohibitions set forth in Section 3(b).
A second category of powers, the exercise of which is prohibited,
are those which would deprive a donor of the trust of an otherwise
available tax exemption, deduction or credit and thus impose a tax
upon a trustor or other person as if the trust did not exist. Thus, under
federal law, I.R.C. Section 671 imposes such a tax on an "owner" or
person treated as an owner (I.R.C. Section 678) if the grantor has
power (I.R.C. Section 675) to (1) deal with the trust for less than
an adequate and full consideration, (2) to borrow from the trust with-
out adequate interest or security, (3) to borrow trust funds without
repayment before the beginning of the next taxable year, or (4) if
certain powers of administration are exercisable in a nonfiduciary capa-
city. The exercise of these powers is prohibited by section 3 (b). The
exercise of other powers permissable under the rule of prudence are
not precluded because their exercise will not operate to impose income
tax liability on a grantor or other person under I.R.C. Section 671
and thus deprive the trust, grantor or other person of an otherwise
available tax exemption, deduction or credit.
Two somewhat guarded but nevertheless favorable tax rulings were
made by the Director of the Tax Rulings Division of the Internal
Revenue Service on July 30, 1964. In one ruling dealing with the
charitable trust, the Director considered a possible conflict of section
3(c)(3)(9)(11) and (15) of the act with the existing provisions of
I.R.C. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-(b)(i)(b) and (iii). He ruled that "the
powers (under the act) would neither militate for or against exemption,
a determination in each case depending upon the terms of the partic-
ular indenture involved .... " With reference to grantor trusts he ruled
that "in view of the restrictions placed on the trustee in operating the
trust by Section 3 (b) of the act, it appears less likely that the trust
will be operated in a manner which will cause the grantor to be treated
as the owner of the trust under section 675 of the code and taxable
on the income therefrom under section 671." It is to be noted that
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section 3(b) applies not only to powers in relation to the federal tax
statutes but to local tax statutes as well. 8
This construction of section 3(b), limiting its operation as above
described, is reinforced by a consideration of well settled principles
of statutory construction. Thus, it is to be presumed that the entire
statute is intended to be effective; that a just and reasonable result
is intended; and that a result feasible of execution is intended. If
section 3 (b) is construed more broadly than suggested, it would render
largely nugatory the broad grant of power conferred by sections 3 (a)
and 3 (c). It is not to be lightly assumed that powers liberally con-
ferred by sections 3 (a) and 3 (c) to meet current and ever-changing
necessities should at the same time be drastically curtailed by section
3(b) so as to virtually frustrate the remedy provided. Accordingly,
section 3 (b) should be construed in harmony with the basic purpose
of the act and therefore free the trustee of artificial restraints on his
powers without unnecessary impairment of favorable tax status en-
joyed by a trust or its donor.
It is, of course, within the power of a trustor who wishes to proceed
with the greatest caution to place an express limitation in the trust
instrument as is permitted by section 2 (a) of the act, which will with-
draw from the permitted powers afforded the trustee any portion of
section 3, including section 3(b). To do so, however, would be to
impair the accomplishment of the beneficent purposes intended by the
act.
Section 3(c). A trustee has the power, subject to subsections
(a) and (b) :
(1) to collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor
until, in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be
86 There may be state statutes which are counterparts to certain federal statutes.
See e.g., Cal. (West's Ann. Cal. Codes, Revenue Taxation § 17788) ; N.Y. (Bk. 59, Pt.
2., McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. § 365). It has been suggested by the Board of
Managers of the Chicago Bar Association that the scope of the prohibition upon the
exercise of trust powers as set forth in § 3(b) is too broad in dealing with all tax
situations; and that the prohibition should be limited to three present problem areas,
namely, to the exercise of powers that would "impose a tax upon the grantor or cause
the disallowance of a marital or charitable deduction for tax purposes." For the reasons
stated in the text it is submitted that the proposed limitation unnecessarily confines the
benefits of § 3(b) and that if § 3(b) is construed in harmony with the basic purpose
of the act, the necessity for the proposed limitations disappears.
Rev. Rul. 65-144, I.R.B. 1965-22 rules invalid a provision in a trust agreement
providing in substance for the revocation of powers to whatever extent may be neces-
sary to make the charitable remainder involved deductible for federal tax purposes.
It is to be noted that § 3 (b) of the UNIFoRm TRusTEEs' PowERs AcT is a statutory
prohibition upon the exercise of power and is not merely contained in a private instru-
ment. Unless § 3(b) is constitutionally invalid, (it is submitted that it is not), the
statute must be applied.
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made; and the assets may be retained even though they include an asset
in which the trustee is personally interested;
This subsection generally follows the common law rule"7 except with
with respect to an asset in which the trustee is personally interested. s8
Thus, the partner who is a trustee would be permitted to retain a trust
asset notwithstanding his personal interest if it were otherwise prudent
for him so to do. 9
Section 3 (c) (2):
to receive additions to the assets of the trust;
No change.90
Section 3(c) (3):
to continue or participate in the operation of any business or other
enterprise, and to effect incorporation, dissolution, or other change in
the form of the organization of the business or enterprise;
This section both clarifies and changes the common law rule.9 The
powers are to be exercised if it is prudent to do so. The powers con-
ferred by this section are often of great practical value. But for this
section, court authority might or would have to be obtained to permit
the exercise of the powers described.2
87 See generally BOGERT §§ 583, 592; 2 SCOTT § 175; 54 Am. Jum. Trusts §§ 338, 340,
341 (1945); 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 263, 264, 331 (1955) ; Uxnio m TRUST ADMINISTRA-
TION AcT § 2(g). Trustees must exercise good faith, diligence and prudence in de-
termining whether to convert or return the property as received. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 231, 240 (1959).
88Retention of such assets is generally approved where expressly or impliedly
approved by the settlor. See, e.g., In re Steele's Estate, 337 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409
(1954). See generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 248(b) nn.34, 37, 38; 248(e) n.55; 249(1955). Cf RESTATEMT (SFcOw), TRusTs §§ 23 231 (1959). Trustees must act
in good faith. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 170 (1959); 90 C.J.S. Trusts §
248(e) n.60 (1955); Fratcher, supra note 56, at 661. Court authority in self-dealing
situations (§ 5(b)) is not required in § 3(a)(1), (4), (6), (18), (25) of the act.See § 7 of the act. The common law generally requires court authorization in such
situations. RESTATMENT (ScoND), TRUSTS § 170 (1959). See generally 2 ScoT
§ 174.
89 See note 88 supra.
90 See generally 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 172 (1955). The subject matter on which the
trust operates is a matter of the trustor's intent. Section 3(c) (2) in effect imposes
the necessity of a specific contrary provision on the trustor if he wishes to exclude
additions to the trust.
01 As a practical matter, prudence may require change in the form of organization
of a business or enterprise. The power to accomplish this result is accordingly
conferred. The common law recognizes this power only where expressly conferred
by the trust instrument. See BOGERT §§ 571-79; 2 SCOTT § 188.5; 54 Am. JuR. Trusts
§§ 345, 362 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 272 (1955) ; Fratcher, supra note 56, at 636.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 188 (1959); BOGERT § 579 (proposing a model
statute regarding continuation of a decedent's business). Conversion of a trust asset
may be required in the exercise of prudence. The power to convert is accordingly con-
ferred. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TRUSTS § 190 (1959); 54 Am. Jur.
Trusts § 342 (1945).
92 See note 91 supra.
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Section 3(c) (4):
to acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee,
in any trust capacity, holds an undivided interest;
This changes the common law rule."3 However, if prudence requires
the exercise of this power it is available without the necessity of court
approval."'
Section 3(c) (5):
to invest and reinvest trust assets in accordance with the provisions
of the trust or as provided by law;
Here the act does not attempt to change existing law. If the jurisdic-
tion has adopted the prudent man rule either by decision or statute,
that rule continues. If the statute contains a list of eligible invest-
ments" or a combination of the prudent man rule and listed invest-
ments, that too continues."
Section 3 (c) (6) :
to deposit trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the
trustee;
The first clause of this subsection accords with the majority rule; 1r
93 Fratcher, supra note 56, at 642-43. This section applies whether the trustee has
an undivided interest in the property as trustee for the same owner or another owner.
Whether self-dealing is involved or not, power is conferred subject to requirements of
prudence and fiduciary accountability. See § 3 (b) of the act; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 205-06 (1959). Cf. § 3(a) (1) of the act.
94 See note 93 supra; UNIFORM TRusTEms' POWERS AcT § 3 (a).
95 Similar resourse to law outside the act will be found in §§ 3(a) (18), (22) of
this act, under Principal and Income Acts or decisions. Investment statutes are sum-
marized in Fratcher, supra note 56 at 635-37. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS
§§ 227, 228, 229, 230, 231 (1959). See also BOGERT, §§ 611-64; 54 AM. JuR. Trusts §§
370-429 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 320-37 (1955) ; UNIFORM TRUST AnDINISTRATION
Acr § 2(1).
96 This act does not affect local investment statutes (§ 3(c) (5)) nor the power to
create reserves for depletion of mineral or timber properties to the extent regulated by
laws other than those found in this act. Powers other than § 3(c) (5) have investment
power aspects but are independent of investment powers regulated by statute. For a
discussion of trustees' powers and legislation see Fratcher, supra note 56, at 627-29.
See generally, 54 Ax JUR. Trusts § 228, passim. (1945) ; 2 ScoTT § 186. See note 95
supra.
97 There is decisional law to the contrary. Fratcher, supra note 56, at 634. How-
ever, the common law is generally in accord. 54 Am. Ju . Trusts § 367 (1945) ; 90
C.J.S. Trusts § 273 (1955).
A savings and loan association is not a "bank". E.g., WAsHr. REv. CODE § 30.04.010.
See 9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 1 (1938). 12 C.J.S. Building and Loan Associations
§ 3 (1938).
A deposit may constitute an investment in the shares of stock of a savings and loan
association. See 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 151 (1945). It may constitute a
hybrid relationship of creditor-shareholder. See WASH. REv. CODE § 33.20.010. State
ex rel Wicks v. Puget Sound Say. & Loan Ass'n, 8 Wn. 2d 599, 113 P.2d 70 (1941);
Rummens v. The Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 182 Wash. 539, 47 P.2d 845 (1935).
A deposit may be a form of investment in which case § 3(a) (5) applies. 54 Am.
JuR. Trusts §§ 363-69 (1945) ; 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 273 (1955).
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the second states the minority rule."' The power is to be exercised if
to do so is prudent. A savings and loan association is not necessarily
a bank within the meaning of this rule.9 Since the depositor is deemed
a shareholder, depositing funds in a savings and loan association may
be an investment governed by the investment statues.' The trustee
acting prudently will ordinarily confine his deposits to the commercial
department of the trustee bank providing the deposits are insured or
secured.'
Section 3 (c) (7):
to acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at public or
private sale; and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition,
change the character of, or abandon a trust asset or any interest therein;
and to encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset for a term within or
extending beyond the term of the trust, in connection with the exercise
of any power vested in the trustee;
The rules changed are the power to sell, whether for cash or on
credit;"0 2 to improve; 0 3 to partition;' to exchange; 05 to change the
character or form of the trust estate;' and to encumber, mortgage
or pledge'"° and to do so beyond the term of the trust.0 8 The power
to manage accords with existing law.0 9
Section 3(c) (8):
to make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in build-
ings or other structures, to demolish any improvements, to raze existing
or erect new party walls or buildings;
This subsection changes the common law rule as to expenditures
for more than ordinary routine repairs.1 0
08 There is extensive authority that such a deposit is improper. See RESTATEmENT
(SEcOND), TRUSTS § 170(m) (1959) ; 54 Ams. JuR. Trusts §§ 368, 369 (1954). Com-
pare 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 273 (1955).
Washington permits such a deposit by a corporate trustee if the deposit is insured by
the F.D.I.C. WASH. REv. ConE § 3024.030.
99 See note 97 supra.
3oo Ibid.
101 See note 98 supra.
102 See note 7 supra.
103 See note 8 supra.
104 See note 10 supra.
103 See note 9 supra.
100 See note 11 supra.
107 See note 12 supra.
108 See note 13 mpra.
100 See generally 2 ScoTT § 188.5; 54 Am. JuR. Trusts § 344 (1945); 90 CJ.S.
Trusts §§ 268, 269 (1955).
10 At common law the trustee is ordinarily empowered to make only routine or
ordinary repairs. See generally BOGERT §§ 600, 601, 803, 804; 2 ScoTr § 1882; 90
C.J.S. Trusts § 282 (1955) ; Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
627, 630 (1962).
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Section 3 (c) (9) :
to subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; or to make or
obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; or to adjust differ-
ences in valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving con-
sideration; or to dedicate easements to public use without consideration;
No change.'11
Section 3(c) (10):
to enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or
without option to purchase or renew for a term within or extending
beyond the term of the trust;
This subsection changes the rule with respect to making leases ex-
tending beyond the term of the trust"2 and broadens the powers with
respect to entering into a lease with option to purchase."13
Section 3(c) (11) :
to enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of
minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitiza-
tion agreement;
Such powers may be implied under the common law."4
Section 3(c)(12) :
to grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or to take
an option for the acquisition of any asset;
This subsection changes the common law rule that a general power
of sale will not authorize a trustee to grant to a third person a future
option to buy trust property. 15
Section 3(c)(13) :
to vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy;
The common law rule forbade the delegation of discretion upon all
"I See generally UNxoPm TRUST ADmINISTRATION ACT §§ 2(a), 2(d). A trustee
may call on a court of equity for instructions. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 261 (1955). While
ordinarily it is improper for the trustee to make a gift of trust property, the propriety
of dedicating trust property for streets or other public purposes is recognized where
advantageous to the trust estate. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 190(n)
(1959).
-12 See note 14 supra.
1's At common law the trustee may enter into a lease with option to purchase if he
has the power to lease or sell and the property could not otherwise be advantageously
leased or sold. See RESTATEMENT (SzcoND), TRUSTS § 190(k) (1959).
114 See generally 2 ScoTT § 1897. Cf. Umroaas TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 2(c)
Concerning pooling or unitization agreements, see generally 58 C.J.S. Mines and Min-
erals § 213 (1948).
115 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), TRUSTS § 190(k) (1959); 2 ScoTT § 190.8;
Unroax TRUST ADmiNiSTRATioN ACT § 2(b) ; Fratcher, supra note 110, at 632. See
generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 251 (1955). For liability of trustee for failure to pur-
chase, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 170(k), 206(i), 211 (g) (1959). Power
to grant or take options is ordinarily not implied. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 298 (1955);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 190(k) (1959).
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questions of importance.1" Accordingly, this changes the common law
rule, subject, of course, to fiduciary accountability."7
Section 3(c)(14) :
to pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing
against or on account of securities;
No change.118
Section 3(c) (15):
to sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; to consent,
directly or through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization,
consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or other
business enterprise;
In so far as delegation of discretion is involved, this section does
not change the common law rule." 9
Section 3(c) (16) :
to hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without
disclosure of the trust, so that title to the security may pass by delivery,
but the trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the
stock so held;
This subsection changes existing law providing that a trustee must
not keep securities in the name of a nominee. 2 The change is justified
by considerations of convenience. 2'
Section 3(c)(17) :
to insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss, and the
trustee against liability with respect to third persons;
No change."2
16 On questions of importance, the common law requires the trustee to exercise his
personal judgment RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 193 (a), (b) (1959) ; 2 SCOTT§§ 193.1-4. See generally UNFORM: TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 2(j).
117 See UNiFoRM TRUSTEES' PoWERs ACT § 3 (b).
118 Such powers would probably be implied at common law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 193 (1959); BOGERT § 604; UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION
AcT § 2k.
110 Cf. § 3(c) (24) of the act. The common law is in accord in vesting trustees
with such powers. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 193(c) (d)
(1959) ; 2 SCOTT § 193.4.
120 In the absence of a statute, a trustee is under a duty to keep trust property ear-
marked in a manner that reveals the particular trust to which it is subject. See note
16 supra; UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 2(m).
121 Retention of liability for acts of nominee coupled with personal liability of the
nominee for improper conduct help protect against abuse.
122 This provision accords with the common law view with reference to insuring
assets of the trust. See generally BOGERT §§ 599, 803; 54 Am. JurL Trusts § 358
(1945) ; Fratcher, supra note 110, at 630. Concerning insuring the trustee against
l(ability, cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 244 (1959); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 281
(1955).
It will be noted that this provision does not expressly include insurance against
liability for the trustee's misconduct as between trustee and beneficiary.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Section 3(c) (18) :
to borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; to
advance money for the protection of the trust, and for all expenses, losses,
and liability sustained in the administration of the trust or because of the
holding or ownership of any trust assets, for which advances with any
interest the trustee has a lien on the trust assets as against the bene-
ficiary;
This subsection changes the common law rule in certain respects.
At common law, in the absence of express power, the trustee cannot
properly borrow money on the credit of the trust estate and charge
the trust estate therefor. 2  Furthermore, at common law the trustee's
right to reimbursement is severely limited." 4 Under the act, the trustee
is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate for expenses properly
incurred by him in the administration of the trust and he is entitled
to a lien to secure his indemnity. This is a permissible form of self-
dealing." 5
Section 3 (c) (19):
to pay or contest any claim; to settle a claim by or against the trust
by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and to release, in whole or in
part, any claim belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim is
uncollectible;
No change.'26
123 See note 17 supra.
124 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 245 (1959). For expenses
properly incurred, the common law does recognize the trustee's lien on trust assets.
See 54 Am. JUR. Trusts § 516 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 285(c) (1955).
125 See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 244(b), (c) and 345(h)
(1959) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 406 (1955).
The lien created is only as against the beneficiary and not as against third persons.
The provision has the effect of insuring the repayment of the advance to the trustee
rendered before any payment over to the beneficiary of trust assets. For a lien to be
effective against a third person it would be necessary for the trustee to obtain a security
instrument such as a mortgage and comply with the local filing or recording statutes.
The power conferred is broad enough to permit a trustee's advance to be secured by a
mortgage if prudent to do so.
126 The common law is in accord, provided only that the prudent man standard be
observed. See generally 2 SCOTT § 192; 54 Am. Jiu. Trusts § 558 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S.
Trusts § 277 (1955) ; UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 3(i) ; Fratcher, supra
note 110, at 634. For a discussion of claim settlement power see RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), TRUSTS § 192 (1959) ; 2 ScOTT § 192; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 266 (1955) ; Fratcher,
supra note 110, at 634.
For a discussion of arbitration see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 192(b)
(1959); 2 ScOTT § 192; 54 Am. JUR. Trusts § 562 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 267
(1955); UNIFORM TRUST ADMINISTRATION ACT § 2(i) ; Fratcher, supra note 110, at
634.
For a discussion of release power see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 177(a)
(1959) ; 2 SCOTT § 192; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 286 (1955) ; Fratcher, supra note 110, at
634.
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Section 3(c) (20) :
to pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other
expenses incurred in the collection, and protection of the trust;
Although at common law the trustee is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services,12 ' the compensation could not be fixed by
the trustee himself. 8 This subsection changes that rule subject to
fiduciary accountability. In other respects, the subsection makes no
change.
1 2 9
Section 3(c)(21):
to allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or
principal, as provided by law, including creation of reserves out of in-
come for depreciation, obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in
mineral or timber properties;
The statute makes no attempt to change either the decisional or
statutory law of a particular jurisdiction. The common law applies
in the absence of contrary statute.'80 The Uniform Income and Prin-
cipal Act, if enacted in the jurisdiction involved, would be available
as the governing law in the situations covered by this subsection.'8
Section 3 (c) (22) :
to pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary under legal disability,
without liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the beneficiary or
by paying the sum for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal repre-
sentative appointed by the court, or if none, to a relative;
This subsection liberalizes existing decisional law requiring payment
of the trust benefit directly to the beneficiary.'82
127 The trustee's right to compensation is recognized at common law. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 242 (1959) ; 54 Am. Ju. Trusts §§ 525, 526 (1945). See
generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 248(b), (c) (1955). Statutes fixing the amount, or pro-
viding a procedure for fixing the amount, are not superseded.
With reference to reimbursement of the trustee for payment of taxes see BOGERT 8
602, 807; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 283 (1955).
With reference to expenses generally, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS 88
188, 242, 245 (1959); BoGERT §§ 603, 801-10; 2 ScoTT §§ 188-188.5; 54 Am. JUR.
Trusts, §§ 239, 346, 355 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 270, 277, 280, 284 (1955).
'228 See generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 396(a) (1955); RESTATEMENT (Second),
TRUSTS § 242(b) (1959).
20 See note 127 supra.
130 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 233 (1959) ; BOGERT §§ 809,
810; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 355 (1955). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
233, 241 (1959).
23
1 UNIFORM TRUST ADmNsTRATIoN AcT § 2(n); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, 8
691.03(14) (1941); REvisE! UNIFORM PaIcnCIPA AND INcom AcT § 10.
12 See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 182 (1959); BoGmr § 814;
90 CJ.S. Trusts § 353(c) (1955): UxIom TRuST ADMiNISTRATIoN AcT 2(o).
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Section 3(c) (23) :
to effect distribution of property and money in divided or undivided
interests and to adjust resulting differences in valuation;
This changes existing law. 8
Section 3 (c) (24):
to employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment ad-
visors, or agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise
or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative duties;
to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations;
and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more agents to per-
form any act of administration, whether or not discretionary;
This subsection expands: (1) existing powers with respect to the
employment of others, "even if they are associated with the trustee; "1 4
(2) power to delegate discretion to agents; 3 5 (3) and power to act
upon an agent's recommendations without independent investigation.'"
The trustee must still act prudently in these matters, but if it would
be prudent to employ agents associated with the trustee, as for example
in a trustee's law firm, real estate firm, investment advisory firm or
bank, it is permissible to do so. If the trustee is absent or out of the
country, delegation of discretion may be permitted. 3 If the trustee
is some distance away from the site of a stockholders' meeting, making
it expensive or inconvenient to attend in person, it might be prudent
not to attend, and the trustee is excused from attending." 8 It is to be
remembered, however, that under section 4 of the act the trustee may
not transfer his office to another nor delegate the entire administration
of the trust to a co-trustee or another.
Section 3(c) (25):
to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the pro-
tection of trust assets and of the trustee in the performance of his duties;
No change.1 39
1ss See generally 54 Am. Jum. Trusts §§ 481-84 (1945); 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 348
(1955); UNFOmM TRusT ADMIN STRAmAON Acv § 2(h); Fratcher, supra note 110, at
633. See UNIFORM TRUsTEEs' Powms AcT § 3(a) (7).
134 Employing trustee's law firm for legal, accounting or investment services might
be considered a form of self-dealing. The common law generally recognizes the trust-
ee's power to employ legal counsel in appropriate cases. See 54 Am. Juo. Trusts § 361
(1945) ; BOGERT § 809; 2 ScoTT §§ 188.3, 188.4.
135 See note 20 supra.
136 See note 19 supra.
137 In New South Wales, discretion may be delegated when prudent. Trustee Act,
1925 § 53.10 N.S.W. Stat. 1824-1937 pp. 609, 610 (1925) cited in Fratcher, supra note
110, at 661, n.162.
138 See Fratcher, supra note 110, at 661.
135The common law is in accord. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs §§ 177, 178
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Section 3 (c) (26) :
to execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or
facilitate the exercise of the powers vested in the trustee;
No change. 4"
Section 4. [Trustee's Office Not Transferable.]
The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire
administration of the trust to a co-trustee or another.
No change.'
Section 5. [Power of Court to Permit Deviation or to Approve
Transactions Involving Conflict of Interest.]
(a) This Act does not affect the power of a court of competent juris-
diction for cause shown and upon petition of the trustee or affected
beneficiary and upon appropriate notice to the affected parties to relieve
a trustee from any restrictions on his power that would otherwise be
placed upon him by the trust or by this Act.
In a formal sense, no change. The act is not intended to curtail
the present powers of the court with reference to the modification or
augmentation of trust powers. Existing decisional law makes judicial
augmentation of powers a matter of difficulty. 4 However, by virtue
of section 3 of the act there will be little occasion to seek augmentation
of trust powers because necessary trust powers exist if a trustee in
the exercise of prudence requires such powers to fulfill trust purposes.
With reference to the matter of removing a restriction upon the exer-
cise of trust power, e.g., a prohibition against sale for a stipulated
period of time, the law as to the powers of a court remains unaffected
by the provisions of this act. If under existing law an express restric-
tion should be removed, the court's power to order such removal would
continue to exist. On the other hand, if under existing law the power
cannot be exercised, the present act does not enlarge the court's powers.
A question which might be posed is whether in view of sections 2 and
3 of the act (embodying the prudent man concept concerning the
(1959); BOGERT §§ 581, 582, 593, 594; 2 ScoTT § 188.4; 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 284, 359
(1955).
Concerning allocation of expenses of litigation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS§ 233(g) (1959). Concerning actions involving the trustee in the performance of his
trust duties see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS §§ 261, 262, (1959). Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 244-49 (1959).
140 This power is implicit in the other powers when a writing is required. Concern-
ing contractual instruments, see 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 275 (1955) ; BOGERT § 556.
111 Decisional law is in accord. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN), TRUSTS § 171(c)
(1959) ; 2 ScoTr § 171. See generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 225-35 (1955). Cf. Fratcher.
supra note 110, at 639.
142 See notes 25, 28 supra.
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existence of trust powers) a court's existing power to remove restric-
tions has been broadened. The act does not so provide. Section 2 (a)
of the act expressly permits a trustor to impose a limitation on the
powers of a trustee. There is no requirement that the limitation be
reasonable. Under present law, if a limitation would materially impair
or defeat the purpose of the trust-which presumably the trustor does
not intend-a court has power to remove the limitation. The mere
fact that prudence requires the existence of such a power, however,
would not be sufficient reason to warrant removal of a limitation in
the absence of a showing that the prohibition or limitation would
substantially impair or defeat the purposes of the trust. Accordingly,
the statute in that respect makes no change in existing law. Notwith-
standing this section, it is hoped that in the absence of clear intent to
the contrary, the principle of liberality incorporated into the act con-
cerning the existence and exercise of trust powers will serve to encour-
age a court to remove trust restriction when required by the rule
of prudence. Liberality in the removal of restrictions would be espec-
ially encouraged if the act is made retroactive in operation, a possi-
bility contemplated by section 8. Nothing in the act, of course, pre-
vents an application to the court for instructions4 or for declaratory
judgment concerning the scope of trust powers.'
(b) If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest
as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the
power may be exercised only by court authorization (except as pro-
vided in section 3(c) (1), (4), (6), (18), and (24)) upon petition of
the trustee. Under this section, personal profit or advantage to an affili-
ated or subsidiary company or association is personal profit to any
corporate trustee.
The court can approve a transaction involving a conflict of interest
which, but for the act, would be beyond the power of the trustee.'"
This subsection makes it clear, however, that if the power is exercised
under section 3(c)(1), (4), (6), (18) and (24), that no application
to the court is required, the matter being controlled by the rule of
prudence.' It may still be desirable for a trustee to apply to the court
14 See generally 90 C.J.S. Trists § 261 (1955).
1
4 4 See generally 2 ANDERSON, AcTIONs FO. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 575 (2d ed.
1951).
145 See generally 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 261 (1955) ; see notes 88, 93, 98, 125 and 134
supra.
1
4 6 The power to enter into a transaction involving self-dealing may be expressly
conferred by the trust. 90 C.J.S. Truests § 248(e) (1955). The act expressly confers
limited self-dealing powers.
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in any of these situations if the question of prudence is in doubt.
Personal profit or advantage to the trustees may be direct or indirect
and the act specifically provides, in accordance with existing law,"7
that profit to an affiliated or subsidiary corporation is deemed personal
profit to the corporate trustee.
Section 6. [Powers Exercisable by Joint Trustees-Liability.]
(a) Any power vested in 3 or more trustees may be exercised by a
majority, but a trustee who has not joined in exercising a power is not
liable to the beneficiaries or to others for the consequences of the exer-
cise; and a dissenting trustee is not liable for the consequences of an act
in which he joins at the direction of the majority of the trustees, if he
expressed his dissent in writing to any of his co-trustees at or before the
time of the joinder.
This changes existing law. Trustees ordinarily must vote unani-
mously in the absence of a provision to the contrary.'48 Third persons
sometimes require voting to be unanimous to remove any doubt about
the validity of the transaction. This act, like the Uniform Trust Act,
permits unanimous joinder without holding the dissenting trustee liable
by permitting him to express his dissent in writing at or before the
time of joinder.140
(b) If 2 or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust, and if any
of them is unable or refuses to accept the appointment, or, having ac-
cepted, ceases to be a trustee, the surviving or remaining trustees shall
perform the trust and succeed to all the powers, duties, and discre-
tionary authority given to the trustees jointly.
No change.' 0
(c) This section does not excuse a cotrustee from liability for failure
either to participate in the administration of the trust or to attempt to
prevent a breach of trust.
Section 3 (b) of the act requires the trustee to act with due regard
'4r See In re Ryan's Estate, 186 Misc. 688, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1945).
148 The common law, with certain exceptions, requires unanimity among trustees
before they may act. RESTATEMENT (SEcom), TRUSTS § 194 (1959) ; BOGERT § 554;
2 Scorr § 194; 54 AM. JUR. Trusts § 296 (1945) ; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 258 (1955);
Fratcher, supra note 110, at 637; UNnroRm TRUSTS AcT § 11.
Concerning a trustee's liability for actions of a co-trustee, see RESTATEMENT (SEc-
omi), TRUSTS § 194 (1959); 54 AM. Jun. Trusts § 302 (1945). Language similar to
that of § 6(a) appears in WASH. REv. CODE § 30.99.030 (1959).
340 UNniRm TRUSTS AcT § 11.
150 Decisional law is in accord. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 195 (1959) ; 2
ScoTT§ 195; 54 AM. Jtu. Trusts §§ 297, 299 (1945).
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to his obligation as a fiduciary. This subsection is a specific applica-
tion of the overall fiduciary obligation of a cotrustee. 1' 1
Section 7. [Third Persons Protected in Dealing with Trustee.]
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a
trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust powers and
their proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
third person is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to
act or is properly exercising the power; and a third person, without
actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the
trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to
exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application
of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.
This section makes important changes in existing decisional law.152
These changes are vital in order to make section 3 of the act workable.
Without this section, third persons might never safely deal with a
trustee for fear that he was exceeding his trust powers under the
prudent man rule.'" Accordingly, third persons are protected'" and
are not charged with knowledge of limitations on trustees' powers.5
However, if a third person acts with actual knowledge that the trustee
is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them, he is not pro-
tected." 6 It is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as distinguished
from actual knowledge, is not enough. Therefore, mere suspicion that
limitations exist or knowledge of facts which, if pursued, would show
that limitations exist do not deprive a third person of this protec-
151 See § 3(b) of the act. The trustee is so obligated as a matter of common law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 184 (1959); 54 Am. JtuR. Trusts § 341 (1945). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 201, 205, 224 (1959); 2 Scor § 194;
UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 11.
152 See Fratcher, supra note 110, at 662.
153 Compare note 24 supra. The substance of section 7, in part at least, might in
time be adopted decisionally. Thus it has been held that where a trustee, by terms of
the trust, has power to transfer or encumber trust property, a third person dealing with
him in good faith is not bound to ascertain whether the act of the trustee is justified
unless the transaction, in view of the trust relation, is an unusual one. 54 Am. JuR.
Trusts § 270 (1945). Section 7 follows, but on a broad front, the more limited prece-
dent changing the common law set by the UNIFORm FmucIAms ACT which protects
third persons acting in good faith in certain types of dealings with the fiduciary. It
should be noted that section 7 proceeds on the assumption that a trust in fact has been
created. Thus, merely designating a grantee in a deed as "trustee" is insufficient to
create a trust Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730, 298 N.V. 895 (1941) ; Davidson
v. Mantor, 45 Wash. 660, 89 Pac. 167 (1907).
154 Ibid.
1i Ibid.
156 Ibid.
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tion r' It is important, however, to make a distinction between trust
powers conferred by the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and statutory
limitations and prohibitions upon the exercise of trust powers, which,
under section 2 (a) of the act, are excepted from its operation. A third
person dealing with a trustee exercising a power, which, under section
2 (a) of the act, is excepted from its operation, is conclusively charged
with knowledge of the statutory limitation or prohibition and is, there-
fore, not protected unless the trustee acts in conformity with the statu-
tory provision."' 8 A more difficult question is whether a trustor pur-
porting to act under section 2 may exclude the operation of section 7
and thereby restore a third person's duty of inquiry. Such an exclusion,
if permitted, would mean that a third person dealing with a trustee
would always have to inquire or examine the trust instrument to see
if section 7 had been excluded. Such an obligation would impose the
duty of inquiry even in cases where no limitation or prohibition had
been imposed upon the exercise of trust powers. To impose such a
duty of inquiry would prevent the operation of section 7 as intended
and provided. Because the consequence of permitting a trustor to
exclude the operation of section 7 would be to restore the duty of
inquiry even in cases where clearly not intended, it is believed that an
express exclusion should be ineffective. The remedy for breach is
limited to the trustee and a third person with actual knowledge that
the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them.
Therefore, more than ever, it is important that the trustee be care-
fully selected, bonded or otherwise a person of fiscal responsibility.
The rule that a third person is not bound to see to the proper applica-
tion of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee changes earlier
decisional law to the contrary."'
Section 8. [Application of Act.] Except as specifically provided in
the trust, the provisions of this Act apply to any trust established [before
or] after the effective date of this Act and to any trust asset acquired by
the trustee [before or] after the effective date of this Act.
The act is clearly applicable to trusts established after the effective
date of the act. The legislature may, however, by appropriate language,
157 At common law, constructive knowledge was enough. See note 24 supra.
15 Compare note 83 supra.
1r9 See note 24 supra. Modernly, the common law imposes liability only if the third
person had notice of the trustee's intent to misapply. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS§ 321 (1959) ; cf. 54 Am. JuR. Trusts § 432 (1945). See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND), TRUSTS §§ 284-93, 296-303, 324 (1959).
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make the act applicable to existing trusts. There is some question as
to the constitutionality of a statute making such a provision, but the
matter is debatable. 60
Section 9. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This Act shall be con-
strued to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.
This is a common provision in the Uniform Acts. 1 '
Section 10. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the "Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act."
The section is self-explanatory.
Section 11. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application,
and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
Statutes containing a similar subsection have been held invalid in
their entirety if a section of the act invalidated would substantially
destroy the purpose of the act." 2 Thus, if sections 3 or 7 of the act
were held invalid, the substance of the act would be destroyed, because
the two sections are interdependent. Similar examples might be cited
with respect to other parts of the act. However, if section 6, for exam-
ple, were held invalid, the substance of the act would not be defeated
and section 11 would justify upholding the balance of the act.
Section 12. [Repeal.] The following acts are repealed:
(1)(2)
(3)
Many states have some statutes dealing with trust powers. To avoid
160 WAS H. R v. CODE § 30.99.010 (1959) limits the Washington Trust Act to ex-
press trusts executed after the effective date of the act. Cf. In re Caswell's Will, 197
Wis. 327, 222 N.W. 235 (1928), possibly overruled mib silentio by In re Allis' Will, 6
Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959). See also Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Brady, 100 N.H.
469, 129 A.2d 857 (1957) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93 A.2d 321(1952) ; State ex rel. Preston v. Ferguson, 170 Ohio St. 450, 166 N.E.2d 365 (1960) ;
Swanson v. Bates, 202 Okla. 128, 211 P.2d 781 (1949); In re Catherwood's Trust,
405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961); Goodridge v. National Bank of Commerce, 200 Va.
511, 106 S.E2d 598 (1959) ; Annot, 35 A.L.R2d 991 (1954) ; see generally 1 Scot
§ 1.11; 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 246 n.32 (1955).
161 Uniformity of interpretation is as important as uniformity in legislation in the
field of trust law. This provision is, therefore, standard in uniform acts recommended
for adoption by the Uniform Law Commission.
162 E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Schwartz, 391 Pa. 619, 139 A2d 525 (1958).
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the difficult problem of repeal by implication, 63 specific provision has
been made for express repeal of those statutes which no longer would
apply. An illustration would be statutes conferring express powers
upon trustees"64 or limiting powers of trustees in specific situations. 65
It may still be desirable because of local considerations to retain spe-
cific express limitations upon the power of a trustee in those cases
where limitations are a statutory expression of prudence.' Express
provision is made for this in section 2 (a) of the act.
CONCLUDING SUM-ARY AND OBSERVATIONS
It will be noted that the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act seeks to:
(1) remedy the problem of the trust with inadequately drafted pow-
ers;67 (2) change the emphasis from the necessity for trustor restric-
tion of powers to trustee self-regulation as is the case in the prudent
man investment statutes; 6 s (3) eliminate restrictions on the exercise
of trust powers that experience indicates are not necessarily in the
beneficiary's best interest,"' including certain so-called self-dealing
powers; 7 ' (4) protect against any unnecessary adverse tax conse-
quences; "1 (5) protect innocent third persons dealing with trustees;'72
and (6) makes its provisions applicable to existing trusts if desired.'
The act expressly permits a trustor to avoid or limit the act's oper-
ation. 4
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, unlike other trustees' powers
acts,. is not merely a list of trustees' powers, but is a rather broad
grant of power, the nature of which is clarified by detailed illustra-
163 Repeals by implication are not favored. 50 Am . Jur Statutes § 538 (1944) ; 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 291 (c) (1953).
104 For examples of these types of statutes see notes 34-42 mpra.
165 Typical are powers of trustees dealing with sales, mortgages, and leases and
providing a procedure for exercising such powers. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE §§
86-114, 86-315 to -26 (1947).
166 This would be true, for example, in statutes regulating investment powers of
trustees.
167 This could be accomplished by making the act applicable to existing trusts. See
note 160 supra.
168 See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627 (1962).
169 Self-dealing powers are illustrative. See § 5 (b) of the act.
'17 See note 169 supra.
'17 Act § 3 (b).
173 Act § 7.
173 Act § 8.
174 Act §2.
175 See notes 34-36 supra. The Washington Trust Act (WASH. REv. CODE §
30.99.070 (1961)) lists the powers of a trustee, whereas the UNiFoRm TRUSTEES'
PoWERs AcT treats described powers as illustrative of a broad grant of power meas-
ured by considerations of prudence.
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tion"' The rule of fiduciary accountability is retained to prevent
abuse." 7 It is believed that the prudent man rule, which has worked
well in the field of investments, will work well in the field of other
trust powers in the achievement of trust purpose with greater con-
venience and less expense. Wyoming.. and Idaho7 ' have led the way.
l71Act § 3(c) (1)-(26).
177 Act § 3 (b).
17s The UNiFoaM TRUSTEES' PowEEs AcT was enacted in Wyoming February 11,
1965. It is contained in Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-36 to 4-45 (Supp. 1965) inclusive. Sec-
tion 4-43 makes the act applicable "to any trust established before or after the effective
date of this Act."
179 The UNiFoRm TRUsTEEs' PowERs AcT was enacted in Idaho in 1965, and will be
found in IDAHo CODE ANN. §§ 68-104 to 68-113 (Supp. 1965), inclusive. Section 68-111
makes the act applicable "to any trust established after the effective date of this Act."
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